Skip to content
All articles
Audit practice 8 min read· by Lars Zimmermann

80 per cent with an AI attestation by 2030: audited by whom?

Germany wants 80% of AI users to hold attestations or certificates by 2030. It does not say who audits, or against what. Three questions for any evidence.

In short

An AI attestation is only worth as much as its criteria, its auditor and its report. The German government’s target that by 2030 at least 80 per cent of companies using AI hold attestations, certificates or other security tests names none of the three. So ask of any evidence: against which criteria? Who approved the auditor? Who receives the report?

Auf Deutsch lesen: deutsche Fassung

On 2 November 2026 the German federal government’s AI task force presented its final report: “Deutschland als KI-Nation 2030” (Germany as an AI nation 2030). On page 18 there is a figure that will soon land in your inbox, as soon as the first vendors discover it. At least 80 per cent of the companies that use AI are to hold attestations, certificates or other technical security tests of their AI systems by 2030.

I think the target is right. Anyone using AI in their business should be able to show that someone has taken a look. What bothers me is something else. Across 39 pages it does not say who audits, against which criteria and who approves the auditor. A quota without criteria is an invitation. For anyone who wants to sell an attestation from a construction kit.

What page 18 says, and what it does not

The figure sits in a table of security indicators. Indicator S.1 reads “share of AI-using companies with existing attestations, certificates or other technical security tests of their AI systems”, target value at least 80 per cent. The table gives no baseline. So it does not say how far there is to go.

Directly below are two neighbours that say just as much about your business. S.2 wants a serious AI incident to reach “the competent national reporting office” on average no later than 72 hours after it is detected. Which office that is, it does not say. S.5 wants 80 per cent of AI-using companies, likewise, to assess and classify their AI systematically by risk. In practice, by the way, the order is the reverse: first the risk, then the test. If you do not know what can go wrong, you do not know what to have tested either.

How binding all of this is, the report says itself. Page 10 states that the target values serve strategic specification, that they do not justify any funding decisions and are not a requirement for, say, the federal states and municipalities. On page 11 they are called indicative. So nobody has to present an attestation tomorrow. The figure has an effect all the same. I expect it to turn up in tenders, funding calls and sales slides long before 2030.

Do not confuse it with the other 80 per cent target. The federal government’s page on the Digital Summit 2026 gives as an example that by 2030 at least 80 per cent of large companies should be using AI. That is a quota for use. The quota on page 18 concerns testing.

Counted: ISO zero times, accreditation zero times

A claim that something is missing is checked by counting. I searched the full text of the report. “ISO” occurs zero times. “Akkreditierung” (accreditation) zero times, “Zertifizierungsstelle” (certification body) zero times, “Audit” zero times, “Prüfer” (auditor) likewise zero times. The word “Testat” (attestation) appears exactly once in the report, in indicator S.1. “Norm” (standard) turns up twice, both times as part of the word for standardisation committees, never as the name of a specific standard.

The EU AI Act occurs twice, once under its German and once under its English name. Both passages concern security authorities. On page 17, for recurring cases such as biometrics and forensics, standardised conformity assessment modules are to be used instead of examining every application individually. For the company that uses AI in purchasing, in quality inspection or in human resources, there is nothing there.

For small and medium-sized enterprises, page 33 announces that the provision of AI compliance kits, blueprints and reference solutions is being examined. So what is being examined is whether the kits should exist. Whether a kit is any good, nobody examines.

As a result, all sorts of things fall under “attestations, certificates or other technical security tests”. A certificate from an accredited body counts. A penetration test counts. A vendor’s self-declaration that it calls an attestation presumably counts too, going by the wording. Whether an internal audit counts as an “other technical security test”, the report leaves open.

Three words, three different things

In everyday use, attestation, certificate and test are thrown together. For the question of what a piece of evidence gives you, it is worth separating them.

  • Certificate: a certification body confirms that a management system meets the requirements of a standard. The requirements for the body itself are set out in ISO/IEC 17021-1. For AI management systems under ISO/IEC 42001, ISO/IEC 42006:2025 lays down additional requirements. The body is accredited, in Germany by the national accreditation body DAkkS.
  • Attestation: a written confirmation that someone has examined a matter. What it is worth is in the engagement: who examines, against what and how deeply. An attestation without stated criteria confirms above all that someone has signed.
  • Technical security test: penetration test, red teaming, robustness test, test for data leakage. It delivers findings on a particular system in a particular version on a particular day. It says nothing about the management system around it.

So a certificate says something about the organisation, a technical test something about an individual AI system. Both have their place. It becomes dangerous when one is sold as the other. A passed penetration test is no evidence that risks are being controlled. An ISO certificate is no evidence of a secure chatbot.

With a certificate you can check for yourself whether it is one. ISO/IEC 17021-1 specifies in clause 8.2.2 what a certification document must identify. This includes the name and location of the certified client, the date of issue and the expiry date, a unique identification code, the standard including its edition, the scope with respect to activities, products and services, and the name and address of the certification body. If one of these points is missing, ask. If the scope is missing, you are holding a nice sheet of paper.

Three questions for every attestation

I put the same three questions to every piece of evidence presented to me. They cost five minutes and quickly separate what holds.

First: against which criteria? ISO 19011:2026 calls these the audit criteria (3.8), that is, the requirements against which evidence is compared. A finding, according to 3.11, is the result of exactly this comparison. Without criteria there is therefore no finding. An attestation without stated criteria has compared nothing. It has described.

  • Weak answer: “We have comprehensively tested the system for security.”
  • Weak answer: “Audited in accordance with the requirements of the EU AI Act.” Which articles, for which role, for which system?
  • Robust answer: “Audited against ISO/IEC 42001:2023 including Annex A, scope applicant pre-selection, version 3.2, sample of 40 decisions in May.”

Second: who approved the auditor? With a certificate the chain is clear: accreditation body, certification body, auditor. With an attestation this chain often does not exist. Then what counts is who audits and whether they are independent. ISO 19011 makes independence a principle (4.6): auditors should be independent of the activity being audited wherever practicable, and should in all cases act free from bias and conflict of interest. If the vendor tests its own product, that is a factory test. It can be useful. It is not an independent attestation.

Third: who receives the report? A certification body must provide the client with a written report for each audit (ISO/IEC 17021-1, 9.4.8.1). The certificate is the summary. The substance is in the report, with the findings and what remained open. From your supplier you usually only see the certificate. Ask for the report, or at least for the open findings. If you get nothing at all, that tells you something too.

A thought experiment. A vendor of AI for applicant pre-selection sends you an attestation with a seal. It says the system has been “tested and is secure”. No criteria, no scope, no version, signed by a consultancy that helped build the system. Under the wording on page 18, this sheet could count towards the 80 per cent. Measured against the three questions, it carries nothing.

What the EU AI Act itself requires

Now the part that surprises many. Even the EU AI Act does not require a third-party attestation for most high-risk systems under Annex III. For AI in regulated products under Annex I, the assessment runs through the relevant product legislation and its notified bodies (Article 43(3)). For the systems in Annex III, points 2 to 8, Article 43(2) prescribes a conformity assessment based on internal control under Annex VI, without the involvement of a notified body. This covers, for example, AI for the recruitment and selection of staff (Annex III, point 4).

Under Article 43(1), a notified body is mandatory only for biometric systems under Annex III, point 1, and even there only where the provider does not apply harmonised standards or common specifications, or applies them only in part. The obligation to carry out the assessment falls on the provider. In the end the provider draws up an EU declaration of conformity (Article 47) and keeps it at the disposal of the authorities. As a deployer you can request it; in these cases there is no audit report from a third party.

For the quota on page 18 this means: a large share of future assessments will be internal, and that is legally in order. It becomes all the more important that you can tell an internal assessment from a mere assertion.

That is also good news for you. An internal assessment can be robust. An internal audit under ISO/IEC 42001 (clause 9.2) with fixed criteria, real evidence and an auditor who does not audit their own work carries more than a glossy attestation without criteria. You do not have to buy a seal for the quota. You have to be able to show what you audited against, who audited and what came out of it.

What I would do now in your position

The quota aims at 2030. Experience shows that questions from customers, insurers and clients about evidence come earlier. I would start with a list, not with an engagement.

  • Write down which AI systems you use, built in-house and bought in, including the AI function in the ERP and in the applicant portal.
  • For each system, assess what can go wrong and whom it affects. That is indicator S.5, and without this risk picture every test tests the wrong thing.
  • For each system, note which evidence exists: certificate, attestation, audit report or nothing.
  • Put the three questions to every piece of evidence: criteria, approval of the auditor, recipient of the report.
  • Request the report from your AI suppliers, not just the cover sheet.
  • Determine who audits internally in your company and whose work that person must not audit.

If in the coming months someone offers you an “AI attestation in line with the federal government’s targets”, you now know what to ask. The federal government has not set any criteria. Anyone who advertises this way is selling you their own.

For context, because the question comes up regularly: I am an auditor and not a certification body. I carry out internal audits and gap analyses under ISO/IEC 42001 and ISO/IEC 27001. A certificate is ultimately issued by an accredited certification body. Exactly this separation is the core of this text. Who audits, against what and for whom: that belongs on every sheet that calls itself an attestation.

Share: LinkedIn E-Mail

Frequently asked questions

Does my company have to hold an AI attestation by 2030?+

No. The 80 per cent is an indicative target value from the report “Deutschland als KI-Nation 2030”, which according to the report does not establish any requirement. Obligations arise from the EU AI Act. For most high-risk systems it requires a conformity assessment by the provider based on internal control.

What is the difference between an attestation and a certificate?+

A certificate is issued by an accredited certification body for a management system, under the rules of ISO/IEC 17021-1 and, for AI, additionally ISO/IEC 42006. An attestation is an auditor’s confirmation of a matter. What it is worth depends on the criteria, the auditor and the report.

Does an internal audit count as a security test?+

The federal government’s report leaves that open. For high-risk systems under Annex III, points 2 to 8, the EU AI Act expressly provides for internal control (Article 43(2)). An internal assessment becomes robust through fixed criteria, evidence and an auditor who does not audit their own work.

How do I recognise a genuine ISO 42001 certificate?+

Under ISO/IEC 17021-1, clause 8.2.2, it states among other things the certified client, the dates of issue and expiry, a unique identification code, the standard with its edition, the scope and the certification body. Whether the body is accredited for this standard is shown in the accreditation body’s register, in Germany that of DAkkS.

Author & expert review: Lars Zimmermann · ISO/IEC 42001 Senior Lead Auditor & Senior Lead Implementer · ISO/IEC 27001 Lead Auditor & Lead Implementer (PECB)

Last updated: 10 November 2026. Researched and reviewed to the best of our knowledge; not a substitute for individual legal advice.

Questions about your own case?

In a free 15-minute intro call we assess where you stand on ISO 42001, ISO 27001 and the EU AI Act, honestly and without a sales pitch.

Continue reading